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ABSTRACT 
 
A range of authors from the risk management, crisis management, and crisis communications literature 
have proposed different models as a means of understanding components of crisis.  A generic 
component of these sources has focused on preparedness practices before disturbance events and 
response practices during events.  This paper provides a critical analysis of three key explanatory 
models of how crises escalate 1 2 3 highlighting the strengths and limitations of each approach.   The 
paper introduces an optimised conceptual model utilising components from the previous work under the 
four phases of pre-event, response, recovery, and post-event.  Within these four phases, a ten step 
process is introduced that can enhance understanding of the progression of distinct stages of disturbance 
for different types of events.  This crisis evolution framework is examined as a means to provide clarity 
and applicability to a range of infrastructure failure contexts and provide a path for further empirical 
investigation in this area.   
 
Key Words: Crisis Management, Crisis Escalation, Crisis Frameworks, Near Miss 
 
 
Introduction 
The concept of crisis is one that has been examined in a number of diverse areas of literature and as 
such it is important to understand the reliance that this study has to both the understanding both the 
concept and its use in practice.4 Crisis, as discussed in the management literature, has been defined as 
“the result of multiple causes, which interact over time to produce a threat with devastating potential.5 A 
complementary view holds that crisis is a “situation or episode in which different actors and groups seek 
to attribute meaning to a particular set of circumstances which pose extraordinary threats to an 
individual, institution and/or society.6  Common threads to both these definitions are that a crisis as a 
phenomenon results from a complex set of contributing factors, is of a serious nature, and poses 
considerable threat and institutional disruption at a number of levels.  In the context of an organisation, 
a crisis could pose a serious threat to the nature of its core mission.7 As such, the preparedness of an 
organisation in terms of its crisis management capability is of critical concern as it may one day be 
called upon to preserve the very viability of the organisation.   
 
This study examines distinctions between a number of theoretical approaches to crisis escalation 
processes.  Previous literature has addressed this issue in a largely conceptual manner, prescribing how 
events could take place, rather than developing models and ground-truthing them.  The authors note that 
while there is much that useful from previous models a critical gap in that these models predominantly 
do not look at the problem in a real-world setting and comparing against a range of crisis scenarios.   
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This study addresses the gap in understanding by reviewing three popular models in the crisis 
management literature, comparing and contrasting the approaches and assumptions inherent to each and 
developing a hybrid model, then ground-truthing the approach with a range of operational risk and crisis 
managers from a critical infrastructure context.  
 
Literature Background 
The following section will review three models in literature which have addressed the categorisation 
of the event progression process as well as the function of each component.  This discussion will take 
place in chronological order from the earliest model to the latest.  The three event models chosen 
progressively address the way in which disturbance events have been conceptualised by leading 
researchers.  Progressing from 1988 to 2006 these models address different aspects of disturbance 
events as well as use different descriptive language.  This section will discuss these three models, the 
contribution of these models to understanding, and discuss the potential attributes that an enhanced 
model of crisis event categorisation would include.   The attributes of each model are shown in Figure 1.   
The first model for discussion is from The Structure of Man-Made Organizational Crisis: 
Conceptual and Empirical Issues in the Development of a General Theory of Crisis Management.1 
Although this model represented an early attempt in understanding the components of how crisis events 
occur, it contains a number of attributes that are highly sophisticated and in some ways have not been 
replicated since.  The authors of this model developed a four-stage approach describing the central 
components as detection, crisis, repair, and assessment.  Detection encompasses all functions an 
organisation contains which can give rise to an alert of an impending crisis event.    
The linking function between stage one and stage two notes that strategies of prevention (mitigation 
against the crisis), and preparation (activities to lessen the impact of the event) stem from this initial 
detection activity.  The second stage acknowledges that that no system can ever be “crisis proof” and 
there will always be times when even the best prevention and preparation strategies are not enough to 
stop an event occurring.  The linking function between stage two and stage three deals with how we can 
lessen the impact of the event and move into a recovery of functionality phase.  The third phase, repair, 
includes strategies, plans, and approaches an organisation has in place to recover from the event.  
 
Figure 1: Comparison of Prominent Crisis Management Models 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Mitroff, Pauchant, & 
Shrivastava (1988)1 
Pearson & Mitroff  
(1993)2 Smith (2006)3 
Detection: 
Prevention / Preparation 
Signal Detection Pre-Event Escalation 
Prevention and Preparation Crisis Inflection;  Generated or Contained 
Crisis: Coping / Damage 
Limitation 
Containment and Damage 
Limitation 
Initial Task  
Demands Generated 
(Period A) 
Secondary Task Demands 
Generated  
(Period B) 
Repair: Short Term / Long 
Term Recovery 
Final Tasks  
(Period n) 
Assessment Learning Post Event 
(Developed by authors for this research) 
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The authors of model 1 stress that it would need to be an approach that is both “tested” and “in-
place” to be considered appropriate.  The linking function between point three and point four notes that 
the return to normal system operations is based on the ability of repair strategies that deal with both long 
term and short term repair issues.  The final point of assessment is not clearly defined by the authors but 
they do detail the need to incorporate learning back into the functions of the three previous phases of 
detection, crisis, and repair.  
 
The second model2 for discussion was detailed in From Crisis Prone to Crisis Prepared: A 
Framework for Crisis Management.  This model defines the progression of a crisis event in five 
distinct phases.  The first stage, signal detection, suggests that most crises have a series of early warning 
signals that can be detected.  The signal detection phase details the need for successful crisis resilient 
organisations to probe and scrutinise evidence and indications of impending disruptions in order to 
maximise crisis detection and minimise risk.  The second stage, preparation/prevention, has the dual 
imperative of attempting to minimise the impact a future crisis will have, if not avoiding the crisis all 
together.  Elements in this stage include the development of crisis teams, crisis training, and crisis 
simulations.  The third stage, containment/damage limitation, is concerned with limiting the impact of a 
crisis and preventing it from spreading into other parts of the business.   
 
The authors of this model note that effective containment/damage limitation is developed pre-crisis.  
The fourth stage, recovery, focuses on how well an organisation has developed systems for both short 
term and long-term recovery from crisis.  Effective recovery is broken down into the procedures and 
operations needed to get back to normal business, servicing essential stakeholders, and having 
appropriate backup systems established to recover to business as normal.  The fifth stage, learning, has 
the key objective of understanding and reflecting on the crisis phases and discussing factors that were 
positive or negative in an organisation’s response to crisis.  A key factor is the need to highlight that this 
phase is about improving future capabilities and improving problems as opposed to laying blame for 
past crisis.   
 
The third model3 Incident Escalation to the Limits of Contingency Planning, takes the perspective 
that although crisis events can be prepared and planned for, in some cases management cannot fully 
understand or prepare for such events and as such may miss early warning signals which could have led 
to early detection or even avoidance of the event.  This model presents the crisis event approach in three 
distinct phases.  The first phase emphasises organisational event management plans and procedures that 
can be brought into play as a means of containing and limiting the impact of the event.  This phase notes 
the importance training will have on the ability of the organisation to implement these tasks.   
 
The next phase, Secondary Task Demands Generated (Period B), is post activation of event 
management plans and procedures and looks at moving from merely responding to inputs of the event 
and taking more of a controlling and management based approach.  A further realisation is that a crisis 
and would require significant external resources to bring the organisation back online.  The final stage, 
Final Tasks (Period n), represents the process of bringing operations back to normal functionality: 
hopefully to a state close to the ‘pre-crisis’ position”. 
 
All three models make a clear contribution to understanding of what crisis management entails.  
They represent similar processes on the way in which we plan for, respond to, recover from, and 
understanding significant disturbances in society.  Each of the models should be seen as evolutionary 
stages and may not capture the fullest holistic understanding of events.  The next logical step is 
therefore to combine elements of each model and empirically test a model that combines elements of all 
three areas in use.  The following sections of this paper address this combinatory goal and report on the 
assessment of a new crisis escalation model against the expressed needs of a number of critical 
infrastructure operators in the aviation industry.   
 
Conceptual Development 
The process taken in developing the new model entailed combining elements from previous models to 
incorporate areas of consistency.  This model was developed as a four-phase process including pre-
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event, response, recovery, and post-event.  Within theses four phases, ten components are present with 
different aims and objectives at each stage (represented in figure 2 below). 
 
 
Figure 2: Crisis Management Components 
Pre-Event 
Planning 
The process of plan development for crisis management.  This 
is expected to include components dealing with processes, 
decision-making, communication, and authority.   
Preparation 
The process of testing the developed crisis management 
approach via training, desktop exercises, and real world 
exercises.  A critical component here is to ensure that 
preparation developed to a level that is as close to real life 
response and recovery as possible.   
Detection 
The components of our system that have the ability to 
highlight when and how our system is transitioning (or has the 
potential to transition) out of normal operations into a 
disturbance state.   
Avoidance 
The means by which our system can avoid the need for 
response and recovery through the use of standard operating 
procedures.  The may include both asset and human 
redundancy systems.   
Response 
Coordination 
and 
Facilitation 
The initial response component of the live phase of an event 
whereby the initiation of assessment and management of the 
situation takes place.  Decision-making and situational 
awareness are critical to ensure an appropriate and timely 
response takes place.   
Containment 
and 
Limitation 
The secondary response component of the live phase of an 
event in which assessment has been undertaken and processes 
are in place to stop further escalation.  Objectives are focused 
on ensuring that, where possible, damage is localised to avoid 
cascading failure of the system.   
Recovery 
Operational 
Continuity 
The initial recovery component of the live phase of an event 
whereby operations are in the process of being restored yet we 
have not yet reached a full operational capacity.  Decision 
making is focused on a staged return with priority given to 
critical systems.   
Resolution 
The secondary response component of the live phase of the 
event in which assessment is taking place to assess is the 
system is ready to business as usual operations.  Objectives are 
focused on risk assessment of returning to operations and 
understanding how the system would deal with a potential 
shift out of a crisis environment.   
Post-Event 
Review The explicit review process addressing both information and 
decisions made during each of the prior phases of the event.   
Learning 
The process of highlighting areas for improvement and 
developing an approach for enhancing organisational 
reliability.   
 
The second component of conceptual development was incorporating prior work into a process-based 
model of crisis management (represented in Figure 3 below).  
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Pre Event 
 
Planning Preparation Detection Avoidance 
Post Event 
Learning  
Coordination 
and 
Facilitation 
Response 
Review 
Containment 
and 
Limitation 
 
Resolution Operational Continuity 
 Recovery 
 
Figure 3: Conceptual Crisis Management Process 
 
An issue lacking in earlier models in the relevant literature was inadequate coverage or inclusion of 
‘flexibility’ into their approach.  The proposed conceptual model (Figure 3) has the ability to develop 
through all phases (pre-event, response, recovery, and post event), or adjust to suit different scenarios.  
This functionality is depicted by the dotted lines that enable the process to develop as a response only 
process (whereby recovery is not necessary), or where avoidance has taken place yet we still require an 
understanding as to what took place.  This limited response could be triggered by a ‘near-miss’ where 
assessment is required to understand whether avoidance was as a result of a particular process or 
because of specific environmental factors or conditions present during that particular event (or as a 
result of luck).   
 
 
Methodology 
This study utilized a single case study approach8 that employed qualitative data collection tools in the 
form of observation and in-depth interviews.  Within risk and crisis literature, both observation and in-
depth interviews of operators have been dominant methods in understanding the ways crisis events take 
place and as a result key theories (such as Disaster Incubation Theory, Normal Accident Theory, and 
High Reliability Theory) have been applied in a number of previous instances. 9, 10, 11   The study reported 
here derived from an extended period of participant observation at an airport (critical aviation 
infrastructure) where normal business practices were observed and including on-shift activities with 
employees as well as witnessing response to out of the ordinary events.  Fifteen in-depth interviews of 
approximately one hour each also took place with staff members to discuss the conceptual model from 
their perspective as response practitioners.   
 
Interview participants were selected using a judgment sampling technique and ranged from front line 
operators through to senior mangers of the airport organsiation and allied aviation groups.   The process 
for key staff interviews derived from a well established approach12 - the ‘critical incident technique,’ 
where respondents were asked to discuss examples of past crisis events in the context of the crisis event 
structure proposed in Figure 3.13   This enabled the data as acquired to ground-truth the process against 
real world crisis events rather than hypothetical examples.   
 
Analysis and Findings 
Responses from informants endorsed the efficacy of the proposed model with a general consensus that it 
was a good fit with events they had previously experienced.  Respondents focused on the separation of 
the four phases (pre-event, response, recovery, and post-event) as being recognizable phases they had 
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been a part of in both training and testing, as well as in a real crisis responses.  Respondents cited that 
the model reflected the real world approach to crisis management well.  For example:  
 
“Look, basically, it’s pretty good.  I really can’t see anything else needed in there because you 
are getting every event.  You are breaking it down again. Which is good.  So, Planning, 
Preparation, Detection or Avoidance, that’s pretty, well, it covers everything there.” 
Operations Manager 
 
“The model looks solid. Yeah. I can see the way in which an agency functions through that 
model. I can also see the way in which our risk and crisis management functions through that 
model … I don't think there is any other – what other considerations would be there?” 
Senior Security Manager 
 
“You got your Pre-Event Response Recovery, Post-Event and the whole scenario we do the 
PPRR. Prevention Plan Response and Recovery.” 
Senior Emergency Manager 
 
One additional area which some respondents brought up that some components of the model functioned 
concurrently rather than as a linear process.  More specifically in terms of response and recovery, teams 
are tasked to deal with bringing operations back on line as soon as response begins.  Respondents 
discussed this in terms of an operational group responding to an event while at the same time the 
business continuity and recovery function of the system would already be tasking up and preparing to 
bring operations back online.  For example: 
 
“I think it reflects it quite well.  I think it can be a little bit more complicated than that but as a 
high-level operating model, I would agree.  In terms of, if we’re focusing just on the operation, 
then I agree but given the business recovery function, well I guess that’s what we are talking 
about with regards to resolution.” 
Head of Operations 
 
“I suppose follow the conversation we had before, you've got some groups that are recovering 
while we still have got people dealing with the response … I think that fits from my perspective” 
Security Manager 
 
 
This finding suggested an extension to the proposed amalgamated model shown in Figure 3 to include 
concurrent processes of response and recovery in parallel.   As a result a revised model (Figure 4) is 
proposed.  
Figure 4: Revised Crisis Management Process 
 
 
Within this empirically grounded model the response and recovery processes are shown as taking place 
concurrently once an event has been activated.  Another adjustment from the tested model is the 
adjustment of the placement of areas of the model.  The left side of the model (pre-event and post-event) 
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takes place when the event is not live, and as such, time is a far less critical factor: allowing suitable 
reflection on the context of near-miss events or minor events.  The right side of the model (response and 
recovery) takes place during the live component of the disturbance, and as a result, time and speed of 
reaction plays a far more critical role.  This will impact on a range of areas such as situational 
awareness, decision-making, and related human resource considerations dealing with stress, fatigue, and 
ongoing support.   
   
As included in the amalgamated conceptual model (Figure 3), the importance of flexibility is of 
particular importance.  As noted by a front line operator:  
 
 “A lot of time you would be moving on that arrow (referring to pre-event to post-event). So 
thinking it could be a worst case scenario, you’re always ready for it, but a lot of time you don’t 
have to go into that actual response and recovery phase.” 
Safety Manager 
 
As a result rather than present a “catch all” model, this research proposes a specific near miss process 
(Figure 5) to capture events which had the potential to become more serious but for whatever reason did 
not.  
 
Figure 5: Crisis Management Near Miss Process 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In this approach we actively close the loop on understanding (or attempting to understand) what has 
occurred and treat it with the same level of post event review and learning as if we had escalated to a 
live event.  From the key informant interviews undertaken, respondents closer to the operational parts of 
the business expressed concern about the importance and difficulty of capturing near-miss information:  
whereas those in corporate roles saw the process as “routine” and “part of what we do”.   
 
A critical point highlighted by a number of respondents was the need to embed near miss 
understanding back into the initial pre-event phase to further enhance the knowledge and reliability of 
the system.  The embedding of near miss practices maintains its own critical challenges and represents a 
key area of future research in the risk and crisis research space.   
 
Conclusions and Future Research 
This study has contributed to knowledge of crisis management in a number of ways.  Initially this 
study undertook a review of current understanding of crisis models and highlighted that although 
utilising different terms, much of the discussion was around the same key areas. From this review 
developed a conceptual model of crisis that presented an optimized view of the process to be empirically 
tested.  This testing took place with a single case study site utilizing observation and in-depth 
interviews.  Revealed during this process, that contrary to prior work, response and recovery process are 
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working in concert rather than a linear approach.  Furthermore, an explicit process for capturing near-
miss information has been described with a key challenge noted for embedding and folding knowledge 
back into the crisis management system.  By empirically testing this work a more real world 
understanding of the components and process of crisis management has been revealed. 
 
There is a large scope for future research based on this work.  First, the current authors note that this 
single case study does not provide statistical generalisability and as such further investigation would be 
required to confirm these findings.  Second, research into the contexts of near-miss events provides an 
interesting future research development for this work as previously published research has looked 
almost exclusively at circumstances where an automatic progression through “all stages” of a crisis 
management occurs.  By looking at both actual and near-miss events, opportunities to gain a more 
detailed understanding of the tipping point(s) by which our system moves out of business-as-usual 
operations will become available.   
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